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GENESIS OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 
It is generally acknowledged that, since the 1960s, the 
hegemonic. industrialized countries of the North have 
entered into. an ever-deepening crisis - a crisis which 
is often imputed to the growing competition by newly 
industrializipgcountries of the South whose exports to 
the capitalist industrial nations of the North and to the 
oil-rich countries have constantly increased. Rather 
more than 60% of these exports carne from a 'small number 
of city-states and countries in Asia (Hongkong, Singapore', 
Taiwan, South Korea) and for about 20% from Latin America 
(Brazil and Mexico), but the range of exporting countries 
has been rapidly increasing (e.g. the East European coun-
tries/ Indonesia, Thailand, India, Malaysia, Argentina, 
Mauritius, 'Sri Lanka, the People's Republic of China, 
and others). Nevertheless, exports from .the South of 
processed products represent as yet only a" small part 
of total. exports of such products to the industrialized 
countries. According to the World Bank, that part rose 
from 4.9% in 1962 to 7.5% in 1976. These exports cover 
a 'limited range of goods (textiles, leather, shoes, 
electronics) but tend to widen their range (e.g. cars, 
agricultural equipment). Although of limited significance 
in global world trade, the proportion of income from pro-
.cessed and semi-processed products in total revenues from 
exports for the countries of the South is rising rapidly. 
In 1960 it represented only 13%, in 1977 40%, and the 
World Bank projects that it will rise to 55% by 1985. 1 
The export of raw materials thus remains of major 
significance, and the need to achieve stable prices con-
tinues to be of primary importance. Not only resistance 
by the hegemonic industrialized countries, but also re-
luctance on the part of 'industrializing' countries of 
the South, prevents the emergence of a common front and 
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explains the_ failure of all .attempts by .the SoutIito 
achieve a: breakthrough by means of UNCTAD, .the North-
South 'dialogu,es '. and in other ways. The October 1-981 
meeting at Cancun, ,Mexico, has once agai,nserved the 
United States to reconfirm its pos'ition: 'development 
is only to take place by relying on and giving free play 
to unhampered'·free ent'erprise'. 
The rise in imports' from East and South, however, 
has been much less than that in tr.ade among the. hegemonic 
ipdustria-lized nations themselves. The balance of tr.ade 
in industrial products of the latter with the rest of 
th.e world· is very much in their favour , and· has even 
iricreased during the last few years. Contrary to what 
is often assumed·, ther.e is evidence that the development 
of industria'l trade by ·the North with the South has on 
balance"generated more jobs than were lost. The North's 
loss of jobs as a result of labour-saving automation is 
twice that caused by imports from the South. 
There is thus no ba'sis to the argumerit that the 
growing, cri·s-is in ,the North has its geriesis and' receives 
its impetus' from' iner,eased: competi tiori, by n,ewly' industrial .... 
izingna,tions.Iftha-twerereally_ the case" how are- ,we 
to explain' the impressive growth in sales of wholesale 
factories and capital eqiiipment by the, North' to the 
East arid South? These sales would not have taken place 
if they really represented a threat to .Northern hegemony. 
'There is .good-- reason to explain these sales and the 
growth of export industrializat,ion from the. South by grow-
ingcomp<atition among the industrialized nations them-
selves. A rise in, the. organiC composition of dapita-I 
tends, toenta.il .a decline _in.the rate. of profit, ,all 
other factors be.tng, equal. Thi's tendency r.esults from 
the continuous need by corporations to purSUEr and accel-
erate technologi:a'l innovation, a condi'tion for'theit 
3 
survival and for continued profitability. Therefore, 
in order to beat their competitors on the world market 
and to achieve monopoly,. corporations are obliged to 
pursue unceasingly a rise in the or<Janic composition 
'of capitaL. To finance the continuous rise in capital 
requirements·, cash flows have to be expanded, hence the 
steady rise in prices of oligopolistically-controlled 
goods and services and the uncontainable growth of in-
flation. 2 Further .decline in the profitability of cap-
ital has to be 90untered by reducing the labour compo-
nent in tqe pro~uction process wherever possible, and 
also its share in the cost of production. Therefore, 
not only wage incomes but also achievements in social 
security and labo.ur conditions are challenged. The 
labouring people in the North have gradually conquered 
these by their long struggle since the beginnings of 
the Industrial Revolution. The gradual subordination 
and incorporation of the South and ~e economic boom 
perioqs with which that was associated, have greatly 
contributed to these .achievements. National Keynesian 
policies· intended to combat the crisis resulting from 
new forms of capital accumulation have now been given 
up, but were· characteristic of the 1950s and 1960s. 
They were abandoned during the growing crisis in capital 
accumulation because they became an obstacle.and were no 
longer in line with the requirements of the corporations. 
One answer to competition within the hegemonic 
industrialized countries, and to the militant resistance 
of the working class against a decline in their condi-. 
tions of living has been automation, which has not only 
penetrated industry but also all other spheres of life, 
including all public and private services. 3 Although 
the decline in industrial employment may have been coun-
tered by an expansion. in the service and retail economy, 
4 
this expansion is likely to be shortlived before it is 
also affected by automation and controlled by corpcira:- , 
tions. The growth of massive unemployment in the North 
is an inevitable structural feature of this new fopm of 
expansion of monopoly capital. Inequalities in gainful 
opportunities for work will deepen in the North, leading 
',to a serious sharpening of sOcial contradictions as well' 
as to attempts by'the ruling classes and states to con-
tain them. 
Another major form by which accumulation is secured 
is the growth and expansion of the arms industry, which 
is perhaps the principal answer by Northern corporations 
in combatting the decline in the productivity of capital 
and ensuring continueid profit. Expenditure on weapon 
research during, 1980 has been estima~ed at eight'tirnes 
tha t devoted to solving 'the 'energy problem'. 4 Th is ' 
very fact suggests thai;. the "energy crisis' is artificial. 
There is indeede~idence that it has been construed by 
the oil cOmpanies as an answer to the OPEC strategy. 
The companies justifythe:Lr record profits by developing 
alternative sburcesof energy which would make the indus-
triaLi.zed nations indepEmdent Of the Middle EAst. Al-
though long..:term projeetions indicate an abundance of 
'~il, it1sdeclared to be scar~e; 5 Thus, loss of profit 
as a result of OPEC's strateqy is cOIilpensat'ed by rises 
in prices. Meanwhile, the OPEC countrie's ,are' obliged to 
Channel their huge profits into the purchase of arms and 
into large projects. In this way; the projects flow back 
to t:he industrialized countries. 
The repor't cited above estimated 'that in 1980 One 
thousand billion dollars would be spent on arms production. 
The armamen'ts race in the North is 'fomented by the sale 
of arms by Eastern countries with a view to countering 
stagnation and securing high profits. Corporate compe-
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tition in the North is fuelled by this, and a cold war 
climate becomes essential to justify the rise in arms 
produ~tion.6 Tb ensure their survival and profitability 
and to offset the effects of the rise in the organic 
composition of capital in the metropolis, corporations 
are thus increasingly obliged to go in for the produc-
'tion and sale of armaments. Also, they have to secure 
raw materials for home production at minimum cost"ahd' 
to conquer new ~arkets'for their industrial.and agri-
cultural products. ,Finally, they have to seek and organ-
ize in the Sbuth· production for export to the metropolis 
at the cheapest possible price" The search. for cheap' 
labour in the South is a highly dynamiC component of the 
strategy of the corporations,. leading some scholars to 
the conclusion that a qualitatlvelynew international 
division of labour is emerging. 7 . 
Thus, it is proposed that the crisis' in the pro-
, cess of capitalist accumulation in the North/West is at 
the origin of the present 'crisis' of the dominant world 
economic system. In this view, intensified competition 
between corporations of the hegemonic industrialized 
countries is the major moving force behind the deepening 
incorporation of the South into the dominant world economy. 
The intense penetration and development of capital-
ism in the South, either by direct promotion of capitalist 
production relations or by reliance on pre.-capitalist 
production relations, has greatly exacerbated class con-
tradictions. This is evidenced by the growing concentra-
tion of control over national resources and assets and 
by the simUltaneous ~rowth of minority wealth and mass 
poverty, not only in Asia and Latin America, but also 
in. Africa. 8 
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The growing competition among the industria:l.i~ed 
nations is particula.riy acute in the ,conflict betwe~n 
the USA, 'whose power ,declined after the Korean War ?Dd 
, the defeat in Vietn<\ID, ',and,tll,e new capitalist ,su;p~r­
powers, West Germany and Japan. BOth '\'liirs had a decisive 
effect on their ecqnomic gro'\01th and pulled i:P,em o~t of 
serious stCignCition. They ,were also.a major stimulus 1:0 
exports by c01;lntries in the (:louth, wl:J.Ose raw material 
marjcets boomed thCinks' to the l;equirel)1ents of th,e wars. 
T!J.e economic boor.ns in the North and South in the 1950s 
and 1960s have iIldeed been closely asso.ci,at/;!d with the 
, , , 9 ' ,- , 
~ore,anand VietnElIlle,,se wars. 
Wherever mltionc;tlist governments have tried to 
,mitigate the negCitiveeffects of'th/;! reconfitituticm of 
a capitalist '\01orld order by prol)1otinc;r reformist pol~cies 
which wollld help to imp'rove the live:t.ihJlood of th,eir 
populati~l1S,tllI3Y~.Clvep~en overt;hrg-\-m ,With the Clct;ive 
supp()rt ()fth!= ~S,l:\.1 f.!?r/;!:x;al)1,Pl,e,~n If'im, Inc:1~n,es:i,Cl; 
'13r?1~i1 ana Chile. Thrq1,lgh -tile Inte,:t;ni3.ti~:mal ,.Mo.Ilei:;\'lry 
Fund,the h/;!gemo!lic inql,lstr,iali~ed COllJ;ltr,ie,s ,h~ve ,'\'lor1ced 
,"" • .c ",'" "., "',' ". '" •• '.,,- , , • ' • ,.'. ',. ',,-'/,,' :,<., ,,'., 
out policie.sCindfitJ;'?1tl='il':iE!¥l'\'ll1ichcrEl!'lt.~Cl ,sl,li,1:Cible ,c:::on:-
d,i tic:>n,,sfpr f qre4g11 ~CiP;it;a,l ,toqperCi t~ ,free;Ly end ,to 
organize resources in s~ch Cl waY,a fl to Elns1;lr e Illi'!.:x;imllm 
profit ,/inci profitCipi1:j,:ty. Fl;eedom ,and fav'l!1rf!b1e incen-
tives for foreign ;illyestmEmt, :restrictiqns qn tqe ir.nprove.,. 
rilent of living stiiin<!iards" ,a cu'rb oPtlle :role .of, th!,! pU\Jlic 
sector 'in ,the' nati~nal economy, ,aI1d ,deyaluaticm of the 
nfl-tional curre!lcy haye j,nyariably peen,stipu:t.Cite.:i by ,thE! 
I~. 10. These were conditions to Illake th'e cO'\~ntriE!s in 
qtlefition eligibJ,e £;or 10aP13 py the wor.l,d Ba,IlJc. Sinc!,! t!te 
growth of tllecrisis, this ro:t.e ha,s P.E!eIl,sl1a,red by cPnunE!,r-
cial banks, operating unde:r prot~ction of tile ::r~ aIJ.d, the ' 
World ,Bank, in ,support of monopol;ist.,ic firms ,and .their 
national ~?lrtn,er~. t1 'The PElr,vasiye rqlE! ,p~ayedby thE! 
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World Bank in shaping-the structure of the Southern eco-
nomies to suit the requirements of the North, is evidenced 
by-its switch-from a project-to a programme approach and 
by its increasingly direct control over national Planning. 12 
Although the sharp rise in indebtedness constitutes 
a serious risk, not only-the banks but also the ~overn­
ments -of the North are 'obliged' to support 'their firms' 
since the conqUest of opportunities in the South and 
East is the only way by which to secure an increase in 
economic power, their condition for survival. The lever-
age exercised by-_ the corporations in the metropolis leaves 
the governments with no_ alternatives. In the USA the 
position of the corporations was enhanced by the decline 
in_ State power after the defeat in Vietnam. The corpora-
tions are key controllers of employment. They are also 
- the only instruments of a dynamic corporate strategy in 
Northern-countries to advance in the world economy, to 
which national economies have become subordinate. Resist-
ance by the unions is limited by its stake in the national 
system. It may even happen, as in the Netherlands, that 
they place -the entire pension fund at the disposal of the 
employers' organizations which, together with the banks, 
decide which investment opportunities will secure growth, 
-so that future _pensions are safeguarded. In this partic-
ular case, the savings of the- workers represent the-larg~ 
est_investment source available. 
In this way, f.ar from creating an alternative em-
ployment and income-strategy, the labour unions are 
actively supporting the destruction of employment poten-
tial. On the other hand, American as well as European 
labour unions have tended to support arms production as 
a source of employment, even though the advanced arms 
systems, which produce many jobs for scientists and 
engineers, create few manufacturing jobs. This illus-
trates the extent to which unions are incorporated into 
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the dClminantgrowth strategy, and the' ambiguity of 
their position which is' dictated by their subjection to 
the hegemonic ideology that growth is on balance the 
only alternative and the best'strategy. The quest'ion 
is whether, given,the E:ver-deepening integration'into 
the dominant world; economy arid the European Common Market, 
there is any 'scope for an alternative appr6ach within 
the prevailing' framework. 
To maximize exports and' to minimiz\3 imports from 
the South, except for raw materials, has become the 
only way by which countries of the North can counter the 
crisis.' Factory operations and sales' of capital equip-
ment to the South remain dependent qn the metropolitan, 
f,irms, which retaincClntrol by, their ownership of scien...; 
tific research, and ,knowhow'. Thus, the transfer of these 
technol'ogi'es, rather than increasing independemce in 
fue South, in': real'Hoy intensifies deperidEmce. 
THE MODEmflzA.TIO'N' OF INDUSTRY AND AGRICUDTURE 
Since thei'reitiergence iD. 't.hEi 1950's' arid 19605, import. sub"': 
'stitution industri.es liavegrown and have contribut.ed much 
to the dependence of the soutli orithe li!orth, cOritrary t.o 
the", original expectatiOriS of: nationalist:...;lrispirea: govern.,. 
ments and: scholars"; Th'ey have greaHy ri,d'sed the import 
bUI for raw materi~ils" interrnedlateinputs, ahd', knowhpw, 
which' was further increa'sed by the introduction of joint 
ventures. Although at first sight these seemed to be 
a c6ncessiontonationalist aspirati6ris, they actually 
ac,cel,erated' control by m'etriipolitan' corp6iat:ions' over 
d~pendent national ecoIionlies. This' enabled a mucl:1' cl'Oser' 
integration with the mother companies:. Theg'r6wing in"'" 
debtediiess caused']:jytherise in imports thatwereneiCes-
sary :!:o'devel'op iinport:stibstittition' indust.ries", gave the 
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metropolitan firms a stronger position from which to 
dictate the terms of their 'corporation' through their 
governments an'd the international agencies, 'and to mani-
p~late that cooperation to their own advantage (e.g. 
'transfer pricing) . 
Since the beginning of the crisis in the 1960s, 
the,necessity for the hegemonic industrialized countries 
to re-orient their strategy has led to mounting critique 
of industrializ'ation by way of import substitution by 
scholars of the North, and through ,the World Bank, the 
Asian Development Bank and other agencies in the service 
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of metropolitan capital accumulation. 
It is easy to criticize the costly and inefficient 
nature, of the import-substitution industry, its service 
function to the elite, and its failure to generate employ-
ment. The fact is usually ignored, however, that capital-
intensive import-substitution industries had been support-
ed and promo'ted by the hegemonic industrialized countries 
themselves, in that such industries served an essential 
function in the process of capital accumulation for 
'their' monopolistic firms. Sermons about the elitist .. 
character of import-substi,tution industries 'are therefore 
somewhat hypocritical. But to sermonize about this hypoc-
risy is likely to detract attention ,from the rationale 
behind the sermons. 
To'make import substitution feasible, an effective 
demand had to be secured, but this could only be done 
by protecting the ruling class and its cadres 'and by re-
inforCing their position. The ,small circle of privileged 
had, to be emlarged in order to amplify the market. This 
'buffer group' also helped the ruling class to protect 
itself against pressures from below for a redistribution 
of power and income, as the new beneficiaries also 
acquired a stake in the defence of the status ~ and 
supported the claim that national resources should be 
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allocated with priority to 'their' industries. This 
irqpliedthat nationaLindlistries.whichproduced basic 
consumer gooqs for the masses. should not be allowed. to 
compete for funds • 
. In Indonesia, between .1969 and 1974, foreign cor-
porations invested more than one thousand million dollars 
in .the.textile industry, but created only 70,000 riew jobs 
. while more .than 300,000 were lost due to the destruction 
of the small-scale traditional weaving industry. 14 This 
shift was furthered by the disintegration of the earlier 
link between industry and agricultUre in the villages . 
. As '·effective demand' .among the iropoverish.ed village pop-
ulation declined, 'many artisans. lost their livelihood. Some 
small industries shifted to the urban centres where th~y 
were bought up and incorporated into enterprises whose 
owners, in .view of· their connections, could draw loans 
from the. banks. 15 
For 'the import substitution strategy to succeed, 
any movements .which would demand a major distribution 
of . power , assets and income had' to be prevented. . Other-
wise,. a qualitatively different effective demand for 
goods and services wou;Ld.b~.g.enerated,· in line with the 
basic needs ofthe.rnasses, but incompatible' with the 
requirements of ~port SUbstitUti~n~industry, as shaped 
.by .the corporations. On the other hand, industry also 
had to adapt to.·the prevailing. power and incomestruc-
ture. Thus,' an' alliance frequently eme):"ged ·between 
, industrialists and the landlords who were major clients 
of industrial production •. In . exchange for indus.trial.iz·a.,. 
tion,industr~al'ists. in Asia and Latin America had to 
pr'omisenotto ch~llengEi but. to support ·the :posi.tion of 
the ,modernizin,g landlords and r;ich·farmers. In some 
cases major 'feudal holdings' .were .broken·,up and re-
allocated to a.gricultural entr.epreneurs •. · In other!:!, th.e 
landlordsmodernizedth~mselves. Nq major agrarianre-
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structuring took place, but conditions favouring capital-
ist agricultural modernization were created. Only a 
minority of landlords, entrepreneurs, upper-middle and 
middle' owners and tenants were to benefit from the 
capitalist modernization of agriculture; the majority, 
i.e. small owners, small tenants and labourers, had to 
cope with deteriorating conditions. As a result, many 
small owners were faced with debts and. forced to sell 
their land. 
In Africa, the lack of basic consumer goods con-
16 
stituted a major break on production by the peasantry. 
Community land was gradually appropriated by chiefs, 
bureaucrats and politicians who, with loans from the 
State and international agencies, converted themselves 
into capita1'ist entrepreneurs. They turned some of 
their kinsmen into wage labourers and evicted the rest 
who were forced to continue. as marginal peasants, or to 
join the exodus to the urban centres. If and when 
capitalist production relations developed within a pre-
capitalist mode of production, they relied on the nascent 
class structure already present within the very evolution 
of social and production relations .. New capitalist entre-
preneurs emerged from among the extended family and tribal 
chiefs, manipulating their p.osition to remove constraint's 
on the growth of capitalist production relations. 
With the advance of caita1ist production relations 
and the intensified squeeze on producers who were 'kept' 
within what were at times the more profitable pre-capital-
ist production relations, a progressive disintegration 
of self-provisioning livelihood occurred.in all dependent 
societies,17 leading to a growing exodus of poor peasants. 
to the urban centres in the expectation of finding work 
and income. Very few were able to find stable opportuni-
ties, however, and the majority of workers'and peasants 
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profited 'neitherfrom industrial nor· from agricultural. 
modernization. They constituted a continuallyincreas-
ing reserve army which allowed modernizing industry and 
. . 
agriculture to :keep wages to·.a minimum, except for. a .few 
managers, supervisors and skilled·workers. 
In the ·early·stage of reconst,ituting the capitalist 
world order in the·1.950s, agrarian transformation was 
sometimes viewed by national industrialists as well as 
by foreign capital as an essentialcorrdition for dynamic 
national development. How could industria.1ization be 
possible without a broadening of the market and of effect-
ive demand? Soon, however, cas all·iances .grewbetween 
corporate foreign interests and national. entrepreneurs, 
interest in .agrarian transformation subsided. and land 
. reform was equated with measures to promote agricultural' 
moderniza.tidn. 18 In'crease of productivity became the 
foremost 'objective, being' considered essential· in order· 
to keeP industrial.wages· and: salaries 'down,' 'and to secure 
urbanstabi'lity.~1'9 ·Modernizationwas· also the door 
.throughwhich· fored,;gn . capital was .. able to .pene.trate into 
:.a,g:ticul tu:te. . It:pe:i:'mi ttedmetropolitan agribusiness, 
stimulated iby .the. 'steep .rise ·of· fodd; prices par.ticularly, 
since the 1970s, to supply more inputs and to expand 
. export agriculturefromwhichcountr.iesofthe South. had 
to obtain income with which to meet. their .ever-r,ising 
debt obligations .. Thus, the hegemonic ind1;lstrial coun-
tries and the :World ,Bank have· consistently' pressed for 
·priority to .be given to the.pr6motd:bn ,of export .agri-
culture. 
Compe:i:.ition between countries has served .to.bring 
prices on the'wo:tldmarket ·down.Technological innova-· 
tionswi·th which to maximiZe:productiv:Lty became a .'substitute 
for agrariantransfot:tnation.and for intermilcapital 
formation through' the use' of . the large, under':',utilized, 
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labour reservoir and creativity of the peasant masses. 
This was the strategy of the People's Republic of China, 
after the refusal of help by the United States in the 
1940s and of the Soviet Union in the 1950s. 20 This same 
strategy was applied in Vietnam, again out of necessity. 
In those countries which were re-incorporated into the 
dominant world economy after World Wa'r II, however, agri-
'cultural modernization served as a major instrument with 
which metropolitan firms ,enlarged their opportunities: 
for capital accumulation. Tp,e resulting shift iri the 
South' ~rom national to export agriculture, from low to 
'high income, and from foo~ industria~ cropsl the change 
from food to cattle, and from low-density to high-density 
useQf land for commodity purposes, all had :the compound 
effect of a stagnation or even decline in the production 
of basic foods. 21 The overall effect of'the penet;ra~ion 
of' agribusiness into agriculture was to increase depend- ' 
ence on the hegemonic countries: not only for inputs bu~ 
also for basic foods, produced by the high productivity 
agriculture of those hegemonic countries. The US has 
become the major food exporter, with earnings from agri-
cultural exports that are higher'than those from indus:-
trial produ9ts. One effect'of this has been that coun-
tries o~ the South, which hitherto derived major earnings 
from food exports, were increasingly faced with competi-
tion' and saw their markets threatened. Also, the United 
States and other hegemonic societies23 have enhanced 
their leverage over the dependent societies of the South 
and use it as a strategic instrument of political man~pu­
lation an4 control. According to authoritative'forecasts, 
foodgrain deficits in Asia as a whole will be six times 
as great in the 1980s as in the 1970s. For South East 
Asia, it is calculated that in 1985 the food grain 
deficit will be' 13 million tons as compared to the sur-
plus of half-a-million tons that was available in 1972. 
14 
Thailand's.rice exports :w:il.1 .. py then ha.ye clropp~dto 
half the 1972 volume while Indonesia's deficit will .be 
six times that of 1972, 1>imilar to that of· Asia as a 
whole. 24 
THE NEW INDUSTRIALIZATION STRATEGY 
The attack on import substitution which WaS initiated 
in the 1960s cannot be dissociated from the urgent need 
of the MNCs to reorient their industrialization strategy 
and to find away of effectively. countering declining 
profits in their own countries. For the United States, 
this attack has implied an attempt to challenge the 
privil.egedposition .whiCh Japan had built up in South 
East Asia .while the United States was involved in the 
Kprean and Vietnamese Wa:i::s. Qptimum condit:I:onsl).ad to 
be created t:!I1der .whichtheMNCsc.ould set up expo:rt ' 
indust:i::;ies .which could make use of the abunclantre$er.-
voir of ch!;la:p labclUr. To t,hat, .end,. 'free" .export .zones 
we:re set Up, initia;Lly ina few select,edco1:!:tJ.trie1>,. 
When :j.abour .costs st!3-rted .to rise, due to i:ncreaEl!;ld oil 
prices and the cOll!pe'l:ition for labour which start,ed to 
press for higher wages, export factories gradually be-
came .established 'in other countries which then had to 
compete·with one .another in offeringmaximt!lll incentives 
. to monopplyc'!lpitaL The impprt of foreign capital tech,... 
n.ology and knowhow, to be paid ford~a:rly, was justified 
on the ground ·that it was the only way by which thecpun-
tries ·of· the South cquld i:ncreasetheir strength to Jace 
inte:rn!3-tional competition. .To tha t·end,protecti ve ,C1e-
vices, which .had earlier .been . intrqC!llcedtomakeimport 
substitution possible, had to be removed. .Also, protec-
tive measures whichdeparred impqrts of,!llet:rqpolitan con-
$umer gqods ,lJ,adtpbe·.r$;t;axed sO.as to givet,he ·~cs an 
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outl~t for their over-production at home. Not only the 
societies of the, South but also Eastern Europe and China 
decided to accelerate modernization through export-indus-
trialization, whose profits would allow them to purchase 
foreign technology. They were thus also drawn into the 
dominant world economy, and were obliged by.' their rulers 
to gear themselves to the criteria of profitability and 
efficiency. 25 
J!t is suggested that this export industrialization 
is a qualitatively new form of central accumulation of 
capital. Production technology has been developed in 
such a way that complex processes can be fragmented into 
simple standardized operations in independent workshops. 
The split-up of production into a nUmber of. elementary 
units allows the MNCs to spread their operations over a 
number of locations in the South. 26 The chax;ige in the 
nature of technology and of production organization 
usually means that 'only unskilled labour is needed., 
Advantage can thus be taken of the huge reservoir 'of 
unemployed labour, allowing for optimum selection. As 
a rule young women are prefer'red to inen, as they have 
more dexterity, are supposed to be more docile, and are 
willing to work for much lower wages which constitute, 
only a fraction' of those in the industrialized countries. 
The strict prohibition of any form of labour union or-
ganization within the Free Trade Zones is essential in 
keeping wages to a minimum. This would npt be possible 
if labour were allowed actively to organize in other 
forms of industry or in agriculture. In that case, 
export industriaiization, advocated as the spearhead 
of modernization, would directly be affected and the MNCs 
would immediately shift to locations in other countries. 
Thus, the promotion of expo'rt industrialization hinges 
wholly on efficient repression by the state of any attempt 
16 
by peasants or workers to secure the .improv~):lIent of 
their livelihood over that of society as a whole. Mili-
tarization'and th~ repression of labour and the peasant-
ry are closely inte~twined.27 
Maintenance of ,pre-capitalist forms of production 
relations in agriculture and industry. may also be quite 
functiona:l, "taking care'of the mass of. under-utilized 
labour.28 They facilitate the absorption of labour once 
it is expelled and at· the same time, sUbsidize industry 
by securing reproduction of the· labour force, to the 
extent that this is not taken care of by industry. Main-
tenance of, pre-capitaList production relations is, of' 
strategic significance in helping to prevent open, rebel,.. 
lion by ,the labouring people. Without it, governments 
would face more instability and: direct resistance and' 
would be obLiged to intensify ope,n repression" which in 
turn wou'ld incur the, da.ngertha;t instabi'lity would be' 
. heightened:. Therefor,e" the partial mad:ntenance' of pre-
cap:iita1.ist· r.e1ations has. not only, an, economic" but also 
a political function in 'the, process of ce~tral capital 
accumuJ.:at;ion:. 29; Wherever pressure for land, reform has-
devel'oped: which would: do away with. pre-capitalist produc-
tion rela;tions, violent repression, boY the Sta.te has 
occllrred, ,(e.g. Indonesia, Philippines" Thailand,. GUatemala, 
Brazil). Such land reforms would· destroy. the crucial 
benefits which. agricultural and industrial modern'ization, ' 
derive from the partial maintenance of pre..,.capitalist 
relations.. The growth of, the,' capitalist mode of produc-
tion, to predominance then not only has a' tendency to 
decLine but also in part. to preserve pre-capitaJ.d:st pro"': 
duction relat:ions, insofar as they serve the central! accu-
mUlation of capita];'. 30. 
'The, sh:ift in the allocation of: na.tional resources, 
from imp'ort sUb.s.titution to. e:icpor:tiIidustrial;ization, 
impqsedby the hegemonic industrialized' countries, also 
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stimulates the export of consumer goods by metropolitan 
countries. If countries of the South show reluctance 
to accept these exports, they can be obliged to do so 
by" the threat that their new" industrial products may be 
denied access to the metropolitan markets. Organization 
of the General Agreement on T"ariffs and Trades (GATT) 
is firmly in the hands of the"" industrialized countries", 
" 31 
which are able to use it for that purpose. 
Similar to imp~rt substitution, export industriali-
zation is advertised as the most suitable road towards 
industrialization by countries of the South. In actual 
fact, however, export industrialization represents a new 
and deeper form of dependence. Export factories have" 
no organic connection wit"h" the national econ"omies, except 
for" the"use of cheap "labour, the land for the factory 
site, some services, energy, water and a few nat"ional 
inputs. 32 Integration into the dorninanteconomic pro-
duction process is vertically organizeqby the corpora-
tions which therefore have little interest in promoting 
any horizontal multiplier effects which might help to 
proaden internal markets in countries"of the South. 
These countries aJ;"e entirely dependent on the corpora-
tions and the governments which support them for ~ost of 
their inputs and for their markets. The industries are 
thus highly vulnerable and subject to,manipulation; in 
particular, investments in them are modest, which facili-
tates their potential relocation. 
The fragmentation of production operations makes" 
each rec"ipient country "dependent on the corporations", 
who are in an excellent position to keep firm contr"ol 
over marketing and also over scientific and technological 
research and knowhow. Imported formsbf technology are 
of little use in promoting forms of industrialization 
which could meet the basic needs of the population at 
large. The workers learn onlyelementa~y and routine 
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skills, which do little. to stimulate creativity. Work 
is designed in suqh ~ way- that i"t does- !lot. requ~.:r:e. any. 
significant iIitprovement .ofskil1s, so, that production 
or workers can be shifted or,rep1aced at any time the 
MNC .considers it. necessary .. 
The corporations have claimed that export indu.s.., 
tria1ization c01.l1d. help sign.ificant1y. to solve the proQ-
1em of unemployment. In 1975,' according· to co!,!serva-
tive. estimates of the Internationa.1 Labour Office ,. un-
employment (not 'taking: into account·the massive under-
utilizati,on ot labour): totalled 300 million.. By, the end 
of .the 20th centl,lry one bi,llion jobs will be" needed. 
According, to recent estin;t,ates" people ,employed· by all 
'corpor~tions which are major, expor,ters' i!'! the industrial-
ized. countries, tota;l 1,ess, than, one milli,on.. A I!!ajor 
increase is" not very likely,. Expo,ri; indu,sti::la),.lz,atdlon 
can never, :deve1op to: sUch' an-extent that it, wil:l make 
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anysignif:icant, impa,c't on,' l,lUen;tp10ymel'lt. Even if ex,~ 
pan sian, wouldo, cres"te.: emp10ytn,ent for, 10, ll!i11iop people 
in the., next 20 yea:r:s" which is ' wholly i!llJ?;r9babloe, it 
would,. only help one, per: c,e,nt of, those: ~h0;, seek employ'" 
ment, This ill.l,lstra,;tes the. infea~ibility, o~ • the approa,ch 
propagated by the IKE', and: the World Bank, as th,e most 
promising road, to deye;t:opmentby tl).e South. 
Yet, the, ind'ustrialized' nations: are. boupd,to advocate 
an export strategy and the investmemt loa,ns r:equir:ed f.or 
this as the: only a1ternatiye, open to the South to indus-
tria1·ize. Theirpro!,aga,tion o:f' the supposed, benef,lts' 
of' expopt indus;trializa,tion, is obvious1.y. rooteq.: in the. 
. .' . .. ". 
basic fact that cor:,poration:: pJ:'oillts 'are, eJ!'tren;te1y, higll 
in view. of the hunger wa.ges tha.t. a,re paid,. Sl,lch high 
profi,ts cpl,lld,perhaps be economically: jUl3,tif'ied; if prod""', 
uctivity in the South in, the export'faqtp;rieswere much 
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less. In actual fact, it is as high or even higher than 
in the North, botj1 as the result of an increase in work-
ing hours (an increase in absolute surplus value) and 
. in work intensity· (a ris~ in relative surplus value). 
Thus, this ·doesnot serve to explain or justify. the 
super-exploitation of labour in the South. 
The creation of export factories in urban centres 
draws poorpeasarits away f:i:'om the countryside. 34 This 
is functional· to the extent tha·t it helps to depress 
wages, but marginal employment in the urban centres is 
aggravated. 35 On the other hand, the peasants' actual 
or potential contribution to capital formation in the : 
countryside is thus excluded, If rural development is 
equated with agricultural modernization, however, and it 
.is assumed that marginal productivity is zero, as neo-
classical economists used to argue, who served as ideo-
logues of modernization in the South, then the expulsion 
of peasants from agriculture is a good thing,36 allowing 
for land concentration, mechanization and the expansion 
of agribusiness. Both import substitution and export 
industrialization have given·a major impetus to migration 
from rural areas to the urban centres, in spite of the 
marginal opportunities .that they created. 
THE RATIONALE FOR.A 'RADICAL' CAPITALIST LAND 
REFORM STRATEGY 
In three countries only, Le. Japan, Taiwan and South 
Korea, has the United States imposed a radical land re-
form. How can this 'radicalism' be explained? In all 
three cases it was .c",rried out to stave-off the threat 
of social revolution by neutralizing the C?mmunist Par-
ties and ·the pressures by the poor peasantry who pressed 
for transformation .of the agrarian structure. At the 
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same time, it prepared the ground for the capitalist 
modernization of industry, for' wh:j.ch the modernization, 
of agriculture was considered indispensable. 37 In South 
Vietnam, the USA ultimately recognized the need for a 
radical land. reform, but by ,then it was' too late. Im-
plementation 6£ the land reform did not favour the poor 
peasantry but the landlords and,' as a consequence, it 
played· a crUCial' role in rallying the poor ,peasantry to 
the n'ational . arid social r.evolution' and be'camea major 
cause of the American defeat. 38 
In the case of Japan,. it. served to round off the' 
reforms initiated by the ruling class in the middle of 
the 1'9th century to ensure accumulation. for a process of 
riational industrialization. The McArthur land reform 
served to create a high p;r-oductivity organization of 
agriculture whidh c.Quld serve a~ a basiS for the recon-
struction a'nd' expansion of indus'try. Radical movements 
were effectively ri.eutraiiz'ed. In Ta'iwan, upon the ruth-
less elimination of, the indigeri:ous' laridlor'd class By 
Chiang Kiii..:.she]/;;, 'the H:rid reform served to provide him 
W,itJ:l a basis of le'gi:i:im?idy afte·r his' retreat from· the 
mainland wheiehe had lost any support by the poor peasant-
ry through his consistent and violent oppositiori to even 
the mildes·t land reform., 
, In South Korea l'arid reform was al.so imposed by the 
Uni ted States, and acja:i:n s'erved, t~- prevent a: taJ(eOVer by 
the Communi-sf: Party which,' .as on CliiIia' s mainland, support-
ed the niH Han t poor pea'sant organizatioIl's. An agrarian 
revolution such as had ta:li:en place in Nqrth Korea ha.d to 
be prevented. As in the case of Taiwan, the larid reform 
was fac.nIta.·ted by the fact that Korea nad been a coloriy 
of defea'ted japan arid thegovernIiien't was able to alstri-. 
but'e high quality tracts of lcind which had previo~sly be-
longed to the Japariese corporations. Moreover', many land'-
lords who were afraid tha·t tlleir larid ~otild be confi'scated 
21 
if a social revolution occurred, started to sell it 
under the market price. When the official land reform 
was carried out, it only completed the process of the 
transfer of land by the landlords to their tenants. 
In all three cases, industrialization was helped 
decisively by huge American funding, without which the 
countries would have had to rely entirely on internal 
accumulation out of agriculture. Thanks to American aid 
to industry, a significant part of the agricultural 
surplus could be re-invested. Initially, American aid 
consisted of grants and government loans. These were 
followed by loans by private banks. Both Taiwan and 
South 'Korea received many billions of dOllars,39 without 
which their agricultural and industrial development would 
have been slow and more difficult. Both countries have 
been hailed as shining examples of modernization which 
could serve as models for other countries of the South. 40 
Both have recorded unmatched growth rates and average 
incomes have multiplied. After an initial period of 
import substitution, export industrialization became the 
. motor of growth. Cheap labour for industry became avail-
able as. poor peasants moved to the urban centres and by 
drawing on them in the countryside. This cheap labour, 
which only cost. a fraction of the Japanese or American, 
became the foundation of the industrialization strategy.' 
Wages could be kept at rock bottom by the government by 
keeping the purchase price .of rice at a minimum. As a· 
result, both countries have become ent·irely dependent 
on the development of their foreign trade and highly 
vulnerabl~ to its fluctuations and to inflation. 
With the growth of the exports industry, the cost 
of oil, royalties and imports of capital goods rose 
sharply. In South Korea this led to serious balance of 
payments deficits and to huge debts, particularly after 
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the oil-crisis .---Also ;--the -'priority given -to--industrial-: 
izationmeant that food 'production was .neglected and 
South Korea had to relyonm,assive rice imports. In 
1978 , ,with, imports of $1 .5 billion of agricultural pro-
ducts, South Korea had become the largest client of the 
USA for food and agricultural inputs. Japan has been 
another top importer of US farm produce, being obliged 
to do s6 by the Mutual' Japanese Assistance Agreement of. 
195.4 which also guaranteed Ame r,ic an investments in Japan. 
Although 'official Korean da,ta give a picture of a highly 
even and equitable ownership of lan,d, in actual fact 
from· one-third to half of' the smallholders have l6st 
their property rights ana have become tenants, frequently 
paying up ,to half .their harvest as rent. Thus, the land 
tenure ,pattern tends to revert to that· wh-ichprevailed 
before ,the ,war; when 'Korea was;a Japanese colony. 
The push 'for mechanized farming will lead to new 
rounds of expulsion of lndebtedandimpoverishedsmall 
peasant's, ,which will help to :keep industrial.wages ,down. 
'Of ' all earnings from exports 4'0% 'remain ,in ' the, country. 
The, other :6Q,%is used 'to;pa,y for impbr,tsor <represents 
profits for foreigncorpbrations. 'As the prices of 
'imports'rise, thisproportipn is likely. ,to lncrea:s~. ' 
Both Taiwan a:nd Korea: also, suffer from ,serious unemploy-
ment.In bothcases,the 'entire growth strategy hasbe,en 
'based ori persistent violation of the rights of la·bour. 
In both countries, but 'particularly 'in Kbrea, the re-
pre,ssionof all ,forms ,of self..,organiza,tion by labour in 
attempts, to improye their income and working.conditions, 
have been verysev:e,re.Ra tI:ler ,than ,modelsofs,tabili'ty , 
these countries have beqome highlyuIistable both ,because' 
.of their all-:pervasivedependenceonoutsidetradean,d 
,because of the internal pressures' tha:taitebuiiding up 
,as a.result of legitimate.claims by the ,working people 
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for dignity and for improved livelihood. In both cases, 
the Communist threat has been used to legitimize a re-
pressive system'which allows foreign capital to take 
maximum advantage. As a result of all this, both coun-
tries are highly questionable as models of development 
for other countries of the South. Also, if their govern-
ments would have to respond to the legitimate claims of 
the working class, their whole growth strategy would 
collapse. 
It might be asked why the United States did not 
promote a radical capitalist land reform in any other 
countries while it exercised unmatched power. It may 
be argued that with the growth of multi-national capital 
and the concomitant need for an unequal income structure, 
interest by 'the United States and other industrialized 
countries in land refor,m as a method of radical redistri-
bution of power, wealth and income subsided. An .interest 
alliance grew up between the comprador bourgeoisie and 
,the modernizing landlords and rich and middle farmers. 
The development of the South increasingly became equated 
with industrial and agricultural capitalist moderpization, 
and in terms of corporate interest, the latter was viewed 
as an integral component of the former. In fact, in this 
perception, agricultural modernization in the South was 
only to succeed to the extent that it relied on, and would 
make use of, the inputs and knowhow provided by the cor-
porations. Thus, reliance on the creation and promotion 
'of indigenous science and technology had to be ruled out. 
In the hegemonic perception of industrial and agric~ltural 
development, modernization naturally entailed incor-
poratloninto the dominant capitalist world order. 
Any theory or practice of self-reliance therefore came to 
be perceived as subversive and as a threat to what was 
termed 'mutually beneficial cooperation'. Th.is coopera-
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tion had to be based on the 'law of cQmR:afa,tc~~e_ a,t:iX_a,El-:: 
tage' as presc;r:ib.ed by the indust;r:ii3.:j.:i:ze¢! coUIltrie!;, 
For the countries of the South that' 'law'ha.s mea,nt 
making ava:i:1ab~e raw material!;, other eXp'ort:a,b.;l,e, p:r::o~7" 
ucts, and cheap, lab.ou:t;,. 
THE USE OF THE NORTH AGAINST, THE SOUTH AND VICE VER9A 
The new, tYPe of export il).dustriaHzation p,;romo,ted, by 
the mOl).opolistic corporations in the So~.tl:t nO.t only 
threatens the natiqIla,l llledill1!l and, sma.ll-'scale enter,.. 
prises. there l:Jy . .iJnppsinga. x:e-a,llocat-ion of investment 
aw<lY f:r;om gqods and inp\l.ts. in r,es];lonse to intel<nal nation,.-
al delll?il).q, but a,;L~.() seriously thl:"~ate,ns, the PQsition of., 
small and. mediUlll in..du13tri,es. and, lab,01,lr in the' '4oIl\e" 
cOUIltries o,f the, .co:t;pp:r::a..;ti.on..s. ~he. :t::erppai:lts, of the, 
pre-cqrpora.te 'pre':'mql:iopolisti,c order,a,re bei,p,g :i,nc:t'!3as=,-
i"· " . .' '. 
ing;Ly qes,t:r::oyed ill t!Ae U91)., i Il E:llrqpe:, a,H,d, in ,Ji3.'p.aIl. 
. . 
Banl:l:ruptq;ies. cmq, cq!1ti!1llCl:;l,. me:r::g§rs, axe t,lJ!3 n.i3.t:u.:r::a. l · 
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effec,ts, of, t:l;lisne,W: roimd. o,f, ca.<p'i.ta,l a,C:C:W,lI1,l);i3.,t::i,Ol). .• 
Mafisun!'ll;llpl.CJYIl\en,t is;. g,F0,W;i,Il<;f, Tra,dj::t,;iQl).(3,;L PJ'.o;t;ect;ion 
and •. Sleql,lri,ty for,.labou.;r' ,are b,:r::Elaking, C!9."W'. all,d p!"e.ssures 
g:r::qw, fo:!:" a lpwering of the pric~ of· lC'!botgl. In t:hat, 
sense, t!Ae 'soci.a,l crisis •. ' in. t:h.e Sou.'bh <!nCi, also. in. the 
'. t{ortl:t ma,y b.e. seen a',s, the. il).evH,able 'p;rocl:l;t.q,t of, t,he 
stra,~egy a,doptedby. m()Il()~,O:Ly ca,p:ita,l to.. qverq0tne, ,;!.ts, 
own. cris:!,::;.. T,o Cr:ea:teck Iie,w interl).i3,:t,ioIl,a,;l worl.Ci or.4er 
whic.h w;ill, meet. i;ts. :r::equir,!3l!lents, capi;l:;a), has tg weaken 
the. wo:r::lI:iIlg· clasp. i,n b,ot:h. t'he No.rtlJ. aIlq th,e, Squ;t.h. To 
a,cl1..ieye. t.1:1Js., in the" NPl<t;l;l, i,t 1:1<1.!;. tq ma,ke, u.s~ o.f· t:lJ.e. ne,w> 
form§. qf P~9ductiol). orgfl,:r:li:2:<ltioIl iJltrodl,lged iIl· .th,e South. 
In .thi,s" wa,y, it. uses,tpe che.<lp" l,i3.b91lr-' of· t.J:le Sou,th to 
press for· <1,. r,e:::orgcmizat;ib,n of society. i;t'l t;tle North,. 
25 
In that sense it may be argued that the present crisis, 
although it has its roots· in the very nature of the 
. . 
process of capitalist accumulation in the North, is 
also the fruit of a deliberate strategy of capital to 
create new conditions for its survival and expansion.' 
To create a 'suitable environment', however, it has 
increasingly to rely on militarization and repression. 
In spite of serious contradictions between North and 
East, there is also a growing collaboration. Russia 
and Eastern Europe have depended massive'ly on the North 
for capital and technology. The corporations make'on 
a large scale use of cheap labour and. have arranged for 
payment in.productswherever joint ventures are set 
up. Consequently, there is no need for the government 
in question to advance capital as is the practice of 
corporations which have started jOint ventures in Russia. 42 
A similar process has now started in China. This col-
laboration has brought about joint. exports to the"South.· 
Many joint ventures in Eastern Europe export to all 
parts of the world, and those in China may be expected 
to do the same. It is therefore not unreasonable to 
assume that, in spite of their divergent' or even sharply 
opposite interests, a common interest tends to grow 
between the ruling classes of the North and the elites 
in power in the East. Both tend to cooperate with the 
ruling classes in the South in containing the needs of, 
and in tightening control over, the masses of . the poor. 
This may help to explain the cooperation by the 'social-
ist' States of the East with highly repressive govern-
mep.ts allover the world. 
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IDEOLOGICAL STRATEGIES AS INSTRPl-mNTS TO P_ROMOTE 
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 
'The new form of valorization o.f Capital ip. the South 
,does not only depend on reinforcement ,of the control 
or repressive capacity of the State, and on the combina-
tion of ,direct capitalist growth and partial 'maintenance 
of pre-capitalist production relations. 
There is. also a need, in v,iew of the sharpening 
contradictions of the deepening incorporation into the 
dominant world economy arid the concomitant Uneven growth, 
to rely on the maintenance and re-activation of pre-
capitaliat ideologies. It is generally recognized that 
these have always played a vital role in the process of 
state and class formation, but it is less recognized 
that they have also come to pla~ a strategic role in 
the growth of capitalism in the dominated South. 
Revitalization of these 'ideologies has played a 
cruciai role in creating a 'national' base for capital-
ist modernization,in Japan, Taiwan; and South Korea. 
,~fter the ,defeat o~ Japan, ,renewed 'socialization into 
belief in the sacredness of ,the Emperor and 'tile culti-
vation of respect fo'r authority was essential in creat-, 
ing unity between the material and the spiritual ,world 
and 4armony between cap~tal ,and labour. In Taiwan, the 
'promotion of ,Confucianism was a strategic element used 
by the non-Taiwanese rulers, to secure the ,allegiance -
of the indigenous popula.tion and 'national' unity. In 
South Korea, after a!1 initial attempt directly to modern-
ize national culture, it was realized that it would be 
wiser to re-introduce the ancient Confucian imperial and 
ancestor ritual rather than to destroy the 'ideology 
which for centuries had impregnated and legitimized rela-
tions between rulers and ruled. In Thailand, where from 
the earliest beginnings of state formation, Buddhism had 
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been used by the kings to rally the people against rivals 
for power, its promotion as the official state ideology 
played a strategic role. Revitalization of the position 
of the kin~ as the sacred and supreme arbiter of the 
nation and as the foundation of national unity, has been 
an essential element in the management of the growing 
contradictions that have arisen since the 1960s when 
Thailand's incorporation into the dominant world economy 
was accelerated. Thailand's Board of Investment has 
even made use of Buddhism to attract foreign investment, 
pOinting out that relations between employer and employee 
are 'normally more that'of a, guardian and ward than of 
master and serf', thanks to th~ docility which Buddhism 
is supposed to have created in its working population. 
In Indonesia the communal ideology of mushawara 
and gotongroyong which was actively used by Sukarno in 
his populist policies, was taken over by the military 
government after its coup in the mid-1960s to forestall 
a land reform which was part of a mildly reformist policy 
of a nationalist government. The promotion of this 
ideology served to mitigate the contradictions resulting 
from capitalist modernization through primary reliance 
on foreign capital. This ideology was closely related 
to the image of the 'original' pre-colonial village 
community as a harmonious and naturally cooperative 
unit, an image which had been created by the Dutch 
.colonial reg'ime to facilitate surplus extraction. 43 
In the Philippines, Marcos has tried to give .a semblance 
of democracy and consensual support for his dictatorship 
and to conceal the growth of class divisions, by re-
constructing pseudo-forms of democratic consultation 
from the pre-Spanish period, thereby suggesting the 
"nationalist', anti-colonial, nature of his government. 
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In th,E"! People's Republic of China, the cal!lpaign 
against Confucius was an essential part of the cultural 
revolution, i.e. an attempt to prevent' a return to 
capitalism. With the initiation of the modernization 
policy after the death of Mao Tse Tung, the campaign 
was discontinued. Benevolence towards those C,onfucian 
elements that remain in, social relations and in the 
people's consciousness, ,or even their ,tacit revival, 
could playa 'very useful rO,ie in promoting that,moderni-
zation. 
In' Vietnam the'Party decided not ,to construe a 
contradiction between Confucian and Marxist ideology, 
preferring to view them as reconcilable, and even as 
complementary. It accepted the Confucian ,ethical ,heritage 
while repudiating its e+itistic ~lements.44 
This promotion of pre-capitalist 'ideology went 
hand in hand with promotion of,the ideology,of equal 
opportunity. ' The deeper that':class divisions " grew and 
monopoly ,capitalism penetrated, the more intensive became 
the propagation through the mass media of the fiction of 
equal opportunity. Individual work and merit a's well as 
happiness were portrayed as the basis for personal posi-
tion and achievement. This had to serve to prevent or 
we,aken the ,growth of 'political consciousness. In this 
wayan attempt ,was made'toforge an imag~ry by which people 
would view themselves as independent of society,a~d 
society as an aggregate of individuals' each of whom'had 
their own properties. Promotion of this ideology is 
vital for the destruction of any form of potential soli-, 
darity among the working poor in an 'attempt to transform 
society.45 
Implicit in the above presentation is the premisse that 
science and technology cannot be taken as independent 
variables, but that their making, use and, effect are 
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shaped pervasively by the evolution, nature and structure 
of th.e dominant world economy and of the forces which 
operate to uphold, protect and strengthen that economy. 
Resistance and controversy are generated by the con-
tradictionswhich develop within, and as a result of, 
the process of central accumulation of capital. Mass 
poverty and'oppression engender movements which emerge 
to oppose and fight capital. As incorporation into 
the dominant world economy deepens and class and income 
divisions with it, physical as well as ideological re-
pression will be intensified by the ruling classes which, 
directly or indirectly, use the State apparatus for the 
purpose. 
THE 'FAILURE' OF CAPITALIST 'DEVELOPMENT' REMEDIES 
Governments in the North and of the dominated societies 
in the South have made multiple proposals as to how the 
overcome the mass poverty which has resulted from capital-
ist modernization. From the 1960s'onwards, employment 
policies have. been proposec;! by the industrialized hege-
monies, through the International Labour Office and other 
channels, to' counter the massive gr~wth of under-~tilized 
labour in agriculture and of the effects of the destruc-
tion of small-scale and artisan industries in' the South 
as a result of import-substituting industrialization. 
Not surprisingly, these policies have been failures, 
having been based on the assumption that the production 
of goods and services should be labour-intensive. It 
was this type of production and the technologies that 
were used which were challenged and destroyed by the re-
allocation of resources as a result of industrial and 
agricultural moderpization. The g:rowing under-utiliza-
tion of labour and the stagnation of employment are in-
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evitable outcomes of are-allocation of resources in 
support of profit-oriented capitalist enterl?rise. They 
are not due to a mistake or lack of insight, but represent 
the very condition under which, at the present stage of 
capitalist development, . incorporation into the dominant 
world economy takes place. To speak of 'failure' is 
thus misleading as it does not .take seriously the in-
herent logic of capital. 46 
.When. 'employment s~rategies' proved a 'failure', 
the 'basic needs'strategy was introduced, but that was 
also bound to faiL Where profit maximization or the 
pUrsuit ofa high level of profitability are central, 
cap'ital has no interest in giving priority to production 
with which to meet. basic needs, but surely it ought to 
do so in order to neutralize or minimize popular resist-
ance and opposition. The evolution of industrialization 
in the South shows that ru:iing classes have deliberately 
pursued a 'minority' strategy, Le. to meet the basic 
ne.edS of privil~ged groups,4 7 even re-organizing and 
improving 'effective demand' by the elites in order to 
strengthen thai;- strategy; In the North the key. link, 
which provided the motor to industrial growth, was that 
. . . 
between capital goods .and mass production goods. In 
the South, however, as acon'sequenc'e 'of its· incorpora-
tion into the dominant world economy and the internal 
class divisions which grew with it, and of the partner':'" 
ship between ruling classes in North and South, the 
key link became that between exports and luxury goods. 
The 'basic' needs strategy 'was linked to one of 
'income distribution J • Redistribution ~f income was 
said to be ~ssential in order to broaden'-effective 
demand. The premis'se was' that a re-allocation of re-
sources towards mass-oriented production of goods and 
services might become attractive for the. elites. But 
such 'redistribution' cannot be realized without re-
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distribution in the ownership of and control over re-
sources and assets. Without this, a redistribution 
strategy will "merely strengthen existing inequalities 
in wealth. This has been amply demonstrated by numerous 
public works programines, the principal beneficiaries of 
which have been the modernizing landlords, middle and 
upper middle farmers, merchants and contractors. For 
the mass of poor peasants, such programmes have brought 
only temporary relief. This applies also to other tra-
ditional income "redistribution policies such as price, 
tax, subsidy and welfare schemes, the potentially equal-
izing effects of which have been effectively neutralized 
by subsequent measures or activities introduced by the 
ruling classes. Income redistribution has indeed taken 
place, as a result of the" growing concentratfon of owner-
ship of means of production and "of income. At this stage 
of development of the dominant world economy~ however, 
such a"policy is incompatible with the requirements of 
capitalist industrial and a"gricultural growth. ~ Effective 
re-distribution is the central objective of all peasants' 
and workers'movements, which ther"efore have to be bru-
tally repressed. 
Liberal"economists in the North have proposed withdrawing 
benefits from monopoly capital and "thus providing more 
support to small national enterprises and the mass of 
small farmers. Like the previous proposals, this is 
entirely unrealistic, flying in the face of the very 
dynamics that created the conditions under which mono-
poly capital had been prepared to 'help' the South,':and 
which relied on the comprador bourgeoisie for cooperation. 
Such proposals were close"to assigning to the mass 
of small agricultural and industrial enterprises in the 
informal sector, a pioneer role as the motor in creating 
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income_<;ing, __ ~mpJ,9Yrne_nt., §ucha V_i§\\',_~J:lo:t.lyigng:t"E!s __ ,t_hE:!, 
fact that the rudimentary use of science and technology 
and the low 'productivity and low incomes in the 'infor~ 
mal' sector cannot,be explained by themselves but only 
as a resul:t of the privileged treat,inent given to the 
'modern sector' with which it has an organic relation-
ship. Some branches of the informal sector are selec-
tively incorporated into the modern sector in order to 
produce components, but only if they provide cheaper 
labour. The bulk of the informal sector is 'written 
off' and condemned to stagnation. Yet this se,ctor 
servE!s an essential function as a labour, repervoir and 
social security system to which labour can turn when it 
is expelled from the modern sector or 'when it cannot be 
absorbed. Moreover,' the modern sector can partly, ex-
ternalize' its, costs and discharge those onto the infor-
mal secto~, so that the 'price paid t6.labo.urccin 
approximate or even drop below subsistence 'requirements 
in the moderilsector economy., Labour either returns to 
the village to reconsti~ute itself or relatives of mem-
bers come to 'town, to bring:them food. Life in the 
informal sector economy is far cheaper than 'in the 
modern sector; and the persistence of pre-capitalist 
forms and mechanisms of solidarity and mutual aid serve 
at least partly to take charge of reproduction of the 
labour force. 
Another remedy to the problem of mass poverty has 
been the promotion of small and intermediate technology, 
with the rationale that technology 'ought to be 'adapted,' 
and 'appropriate'. ,This philosophy emerged in the ',1960s 
,in direct response to the growth of monopoly capitalism 
and to the disastrous effects which the sale of technology 
by the North to the South ,h~d on the dist'ribution of 
power, assets, work and income. 
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The original proposal for the spread of intermediate 
technology was based on several premiSses, such as: 
that work-places have to be created in the areas 
where the people are living now, and not prima-
rily in metropolitan areas into which they tend 
to migrate, that these work-places must beJ on 
the average, cheap enough· so that they can be 
created in large numbers without this calling for 
an unattainable level of-savings and 'imports, 
that the production methods employed must be re-
latively simple, so that the demands for high 
skills are minimized, not only in the production 
process itself, but also in matters of organiza-
tion, raw materials supply, financing, marketing 
and so forth, and that production should be largely 
from local materials for local use. 
The types of industry to be tackled immediately would 
be 'every kind of consumers' goods industry, including 
building materials, agricultural implements and equip-
ment for intermediate technology. It was assumed that' 
genuine eC9nomic development could only take place in as 
far as people would be able to make their own tools and 
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other equipment. 
These premisses are unquestionably very attractive. 
If the proposals on intermediate technology are related 
to the concrete historical setting of the South, however, 
it seems that the productive activities which interme-
diate technology wishes to bring about are challenged 
by the influx of consumer goods from abroad and by the 
development of import substitution industries. This 
process has occurred simultaneously with the development 
ofa class and income structure which, as observed above; 
orients 'investment and State support into directions 
that prevent effective activation of the productive and 
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creative cCipaci!-y .of . the majerity p"pulatien.Thus, 
priority fer intermediate technelegy directly cenflicts 
with. the allecatien .of .reseurces andwi.th investment 
patterns.which respend. te the interests .of thedemi-
nant classes and asseciated greups. The intreductien 
.of intermediate technelegy weuldrequire; ameng ether 
things,.strict centrel ever fereign and asseciated 
inves.tments., ever patterns .of censumptien (in .. particular, 
. . . . 
censpicueus censumptien),and a re-erientatien tewards 
the preductien .of services and censumer geeds which are 
necessary if the mass .of the pepulatien-is te live 
decently and:to.be creative and preductive. This appreach 
suffers frem the same flaw as that which it is intended 
te cembat. It is equally mechanistic and technecratic 
in that it is based· en the pre'misses that .once preductive 
fercesef the 'right size' have been intreduced, these 
will lead te the grewth .of suitable. preductien relatiens 
which might de away with the problems .of marginalizatien 
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and mass peverty. 'The fundamental fact tends te be 
ignered that the genesis and use ··Qf science andtechnelegy 
have always been crucially shaped ,by, the evolutien . .of 
preductienrelatiens'ef.the deminant medeef ,Preductien 
.and .of the underlying hegemenic ideelegy. 
The develepment .of preductive ferces, in turn, has a 
'-farreaching effect, on: the' evelutien .of production rela-
tions, which becomes manifest in the evolving class 
structure. An essential characteristic .of the,hegemenic 
ideolqgy of monepely capitalism-is that science and tech-
nelegy are perceived as neutral, value-free instruments. 
Any indicatien of the ways in. which their use and effects 
are shaped by the partic'ular nature and structure .of 
social relatiens and are·inherently class,..biased,'causes 
sUJ;'pri'se ifno,t indi·gnation: a react~on:thatlsinevi-, 
table if it is assumed that science and technology exist 
in their own right, and therefere should net be 'mixed 
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,up' , wi th questions of economic and political nature. 
This suggests the extent to which the view has become 
dominant that science and technology are autonomous. 
The internationalization of dominant consciousness is 
only one dimension of the general process of people's 
adaptation to the requirements of the dominant capita-
list mode of production which needs to portray itself 
and its conseq'uences as beneficial, inevitable and 
rational. This view,assumes that productive relations, 
and also the organization of society and of the State 
to the extent that these support dominant productive 
relations, are identical with, and a natural extension 
of the development of productive forces. People a,re 
therefore expected to perceive their subordination to 
the requirements of the productive apparatus as naturali 
i.e. that ,they cease to perceive it as subordination. 50 
The situation in which 'all the sciences have been 
'pressed into the service of capital', in which invention 
,becomes a brand of business" and the application of 
science to direct production itself becomes a prospect 
which determines and solicits it~ is only found speci-
51 fically in,the advanced stage 'of monopoly capitalism. 
The adaptation of education and of university teaching 
and research to the requirements of capital accumulation 
is an integral part of .this process. 
One consequence of the ide~tification of productive 
relations with, the development of productive forces is 
that the need for their transformation is no longer 
perceived. This diverts attention from change as a 
historical process and ,shrouds any perception of histo-
ricalchange, thereby reducing history to what is judged 
to be valid and therefore legitimate in the prevailing 
hegemonicvalues.52 One consequence is that a unilinear 
vision of development becomes the only alternative, in 
which all countries and 'peoples that wish to 'achieve 
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develapment' must pass thraugh the- same pracess, fallaw.: 
the' same pracedures, and apply the same .tecnniques that 
have been Implemented in the industrially advanced 
cauntries. Develapment is thus equated with what the 
daminant classes in the capitalist care cauntries deem 
to. be desirable. 
In this way, science as a methadalagical and 
experimental appraach to. cancrete prablems which 
require specific salutians in particular cantexts, is 
replaced by the mechanical applicatian af imparted far-
mulae which have nat been devised to. respand to. natianal 
ar lacal prablems. Science thus lases its functian in 
the search fram within far salutians to. be adapted to. 
varying prablems. Instead af being an instrument with 
which to. identify real issues and to. find alternative 
appraaches that might lead to. new projets de civilisa-
tion implying a ma're equal sharing af well-being and 
welfare, it serves to. pramate 'private ratianality' at 
the expense af sacial ratianality in service af the 
interests and.needs af the majarity af the warld's papu-
latian. 
THE IDEOLOGY OF UNILINEAR QEVELOPMENT 
'bevelapment', defined in hegemanic 'idealagy as ecanamic 
grawth through the applicat'ian af farms af, science and., 
technalagy which have served as instruments af manapolY 
capitalism, is being disputed'less',and less. Nat anly 
in the Narth, but also. in the Sauth and the East (Saviet 
Unian and China), develapment is understaad basically 
as modernizatian thraugh the maximizatian af grawth 
. . , 53 
thanks to. the £ullest develapment af praductive farces. 
The same idealagical premisse is,prevalent~ The cancern 
af the East ana the Sa1.lth has become 'ho.w to. catch,up'. 
In the afficial Marxist perspective, the majar prablem 
is that af 'cantral. If ',anly 'science and technalagy 
37 
could be properly controlled, the problem would be 
solved. Once the struggle for independence is over, 
official concern ~ooner or later becomes how to deve-
lop that same science and technology. This convergence 
in ideology shows that, within Marxist thinking about 
the future, the ideals of 19th century bourgeois ideo-
logy have not yet been rejected, other than for prac-
tical reasons out of temporary necessity. Marx's own 
thinking was shaped profoundly by' this view. 
The economic philosophy of the Bolshevik Party was 
reflected in Stalin's relentless pursuit of growth .. The 
search for equality was to him a petit bourgeois concern, 
a concern that can be traced to the Bolshevik acceptance 
of the views predominating in the General Social Democratic 
party, i.e. the non-dialectical 'Marxist' economistic 
.conceptions of Kautsky and his harmony model, implying 
subordination of· the working population to the 'ob.ective' 
requirements of capital. 54· Bolsheviks posited that 
class contradictions had been overcome, 'as the state had 
taken control of the means of production on behalf of 
the working people. The thesis that State and Government 
Party are in themselves expressions of contradictions in 
society, developed by Mao as the basis for his socialist 
strategy, was diametrically opposed to the Soviet thesis 
which now has also been adopted by the Chinese Communist 
Party. 
In order to achieve state power as the necessary 
precondition for the promotion of central accumulation 
as the basis for growth, Lenin viewed the use of force 
by the ·Bolshevik Party,' even in its most violent form, 
not only as acceptable but as a 'normal' means of poli-
tical activity.' The people's democratic mass organiza-
tions such as the Soviets, the labour unions and the 
peasant organizations, were perce'ived as instruments 
to be controlled and manipulated by the Party, rather 
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than as the, found a tions of a n,ew democratic order. In 
that ,sense, Stalin was a faithful executor of, the domi-
nant ideas about the road to power and growth which were 
,held by the leadership of the Party. Thus, the theory 
and practice of 'proletarian ,dictatorship' as a more 
advanced form of democracy held by the, large majority-of 
the people, was from its early inception subverted and 
transformed into an oligarchical bureaucratic dictator-
~hip over and against the working population. 
In sharp contrast to this position are the views of 
Antonio Gramsci who refused to think of violence as .the 
automatic generator of new values and new socialist 
relationships.55 'I~'his conception, the labouring 
people, must I::>ecome politically and socially 'hegemonic' 
before taking power. Unless the achievement of power is 
preceded and accompanied by growth of a broad social 
consensus rooted in intellectual and moral reformation 
among the majority of the population, a'chang~ from one 
form' of despotism to another is likely, i.e. from capi-
talist ,exploitation to an even more repressive, bureau-
cratic form of domination. Uniike Lenin, Gramsci re~ 
jected a Party which would'be an non-accountable elite 
organ whose task was to rule and steer the masses, 
thanks to its supposed intellectual and ideological 
supremacy. In Gramsci' s' ,view, by democratic practices 
withiil and in its relations with the people" the Party 
should serve as the prefiguration of a new society, 
through the unceasing democratic sO,cialization of power 
at all levels a~d in all instances oi social practice. 
Thus, he saw the conquest of power as indivisible from 
the achievement of legitimacy by the growth of de'mocra-
tic practices within the Party and between the Party and 
the people. Without such democratic practices the 
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leadership would be bound to resort to force and coer-
cicm against the very groups of the population whose 
emancipation it had intended to promote. 56 This use of 
force should be distinguished from that used by a ruling 
class whose po.wer and control over the. majority of the 
people is based on the systematic use of violence and 
repression. Violence and repression cannot be limited 
to restricted physical 'force, but in this view 'also 
refers to structural forms· of expression, i.e. those 
forms of economic, political' and social .or·ganization 
which prevent the majority of the people from surviving 
with minimum conditions of livelihood. Once new power 
is established, however,. how can democratic control be 
effectively promoted and gu·aranteed? 
The class and economi'c structure in the Soviet 
Union today have been shaped profoundly by the linear 
mechanistic '.Marxist' conception that i:s predominant in 
the Bolshevik Party. This conception has served as 
basis for the argument that:no' societY'c;ould attain 
socialism without first going through the capitalist 
stage. Lenin's view that a socialist society could be 
organized·· by combining the transformation of productive 
relations with the wholesale introduction of western 
technology, manifested in his great admiration for 
Taylor's 'scientific·' management theory and his tendency 
to rely on American engineers, revealed a mechanistic 
andnon-"dialecticalconceptionregarding productive 
relations and productive forces. 57 The same view was 
held by other leading Bolsheviks who had been refugees in 
the United States and. Europe, and led them to see con- . 
centrated growth as the only road to accumulation. 
Mao's approach, which he presented in 1956 and 
-which served as a basis for the Great Leap Forward, 
signified a radical departure from the theory and prac-
tice of accumulation prevalent in the Soviet Union. As 
he argued: 'Heavy industries can accumulate capital. So 
can' light industries and agriculture. However, light 
industry and agriculture can accumulate 'more capital and 
faster,.58 
Maurice Dobb gave this.approach a theoretical 
formulation by identifying two criteria under whi~h the 
choice of. lower capital intensity would not be prejudi-
cial to the.objective of maximUm growth (assuming that 
~aximum growth would be a legitimate and necessary objec-
tive for countries with a low level of development of 
productive forces and low levels of welfare); 
1. Where a lower capital intensity, when combined with 
a smaller scale, leads to a shorter gestation 
period for investment and, hence, makes it. possible 
to reinvest surplus accruing from the investment 
earlier ,(a -'.compound' effect). The amount of 
surplus per unit of capital investment may be 
smaller blitthe compound effect could lead ·to a 
higher rate of growth. 
2. Where ,additional employment of the labour force 
does not involve. any additional claim upon the 
. . 59 investment funds of the economy. 
This was the approach originally taken by the People's 
Republic of China where it had its origins in the Yenan 
experience. China's isolation, forced upon it by first 
the United States and then by the Soviet Union, impelled 
it to pursue a policy of self~r~liance. The new ideology 
required a radical attack on the notion that culture, 
science and technology were the privileged domain of 
intellectuals and specialists, and the mass line .became 
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to involve the whole people in creative involvement in 
developing science and technology. The cultural revo-
lution was launched to challenge the growth of a privi-
leged class and of its bureaucratic monopolistic control 
over: the state. The Maoist strategy ·of self-reliance 
was born out of necessity and represented at the ti~e a 
.pragmatic ·attempt to meet theconsequence·s of the refus.al 
of the ·two great powers to help, afraid as they were of 
the potential power of the· People' s Republic of· China. 
After the victory b~ Vietnam, the weakened United States 
and the new leadership of the People's Republic of China 
entered into an alliance. In· view of the. profound 
changes in all aspects of Chinese strategy,. including 
science and technology, many leading cadres who ·had been 
ousted in the 1950s and 'sixties. in view of their oppo-
sition to Mao's strategy, returned to join the movement 
for ·rapid modernization. In spite of the·disastrous 
implications of the dominant growth strategyirt terms of . 
income distribution, work opportunities, resource use 
and the environment, this is the only strategy that is 
considered viable and realistic in the North, East and 
South. This rela·tive consensus is at the same time bound 
to aggravate the conflic.t between the ruling classes of 
the major contending powers over the control and distri-
bution of resources. 
SOME IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA'S MODERNIZATION POLICY 
To pursue its new strategy.of modernization, the People's 
Republic of China has to rely increasingly, like Russia 
and America, on exports, which will enable it to accele-
rate· its import of foreign technology. 
The principal potential market for· the relatively 
unsophisticated capital and consumer goods which China 
can export is Southeast Asia, where social transforma-
tion which would.allow. the masses to meet their basic 
needs by a fundamental restructuring of power and income 
might at this stage not be in China's interest. The 
postponement of national independence and self~reliance 
in Southeast Asia might well enhance growing reliance on 
Chinese exports. Since its change of policy, the People's 
Republic has not only tried ·to develop the best connec-:-
tions possible' with the most right-wing repressive 
governments in the. world at large, but also to come to 
'terms with the dictatorial governments of ASEAN and to 
es.tablish intimate forms of cooperation with their 
com~rador bourgeoisies • 
. In Thailand, in particular, relentless efforts by 
China to develop friendship with extreme rightist poli-
tical leaders, with the military government, as well as 
with the comprador'bougeoisie, are striking. Chinese 
military commanders have visited Thai army commanders, 
the chief training centre of .Thai counter-insurgency 
operations, as well as strategic posts of the Thai 
border.policfi! from where the. Thai Liberation Army is 
. combatted. 
The Chinese approach to ASEAN is' allegedly inspired 
by fear for Russia and Vietnam. But this may have been 
compounded by China in order to push for and to legiti-' 
. mize its claim on Southeast Asia as its traditional 
domain, as a future supplier of raw materials, and ,!-S 'a 
market. To .realize this, China would need to share its 
claims with ~erica and Japan. While these countries 
would for the time being continue to supply heavy equip-
ment and higher quality capital and consumer goods, 
China might provide the less sophisticated capital and 
consumer goods. In actual fact, it has fory~ars been 
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supplying this' market through its networks in Hong Kong 
and Singapore. The existing Southeast Asian trade 
network at the national and local levels, is controlled 
largely by merchants and traders of. Chinese ,descent. , 
The money market, export businesses, impbrt substitution 
industry, construction, the food business, and other 
,'vital areas of economic activity, are also controlled to 
a signi~icant extent by such entrepreneurs, Who have 
always been allowed to operate as long as they were 
willing to share part of their profits with the indige-
nous elite, political leaders, the military and leading 
govern~ent' official's. 60 In'several countries of the 
region this close collaboration between the indigenous 
elite 'and the comprador bourgeoisie of Chinese origin 
has led to increasingly close forms,of integration, 
often sealed by intermarriage. Not infrequently". the 
indige'nous fractions of the 'ruling. clCl-sses 'have fomented 
racist sentiments against the majority of poor and 
middle class Chinese so as to divert attention from their 
intimate 'collaboration with the powerful Chinese ,business 
community. Thus, the unification of the majority of poor 
indigenous workers and peasants with the minority of 
,poor Chinese has been prevented. 
The present Chinese government has undertaken a 
major campaign of inviting overseas Chinese, to set,up 
businesses in China, or alternatively, to help moderni-
zation thr'ough their remittances, creating special 
privileges and incentives for the, purpose. This move is 
likely to create anxiety if not outright opposition 
among some of the Southeast Asian indigenous elites and 
governments, as such transfers or exports ~f capital 
would drain funds away from national investment and 
reduce their own profit opportunities. This makes it 
easy for some governments, for rea~oris of political~ 
expedience and in order to curry fa:vour with the poor 
and middle class populations, to question the loyalty of 
the overseas Chinese. The alleged threat, which usually 
takes on a racist bent, ',provides governments~'with a good 
reason to watch the Chinese and to try to secure their 
continued collaboration and favour. Some surface measures 
may be called for at times to assu'agepopular resentment 
and to contain local revolts,by the exploited indigenous 
popuiation. 
If, in the future, major political transformations 
would occur in the countries of Southeast Asia-Which are 
still dqminated by America, Japan and Western Europe, the, 
Chinese compradors, whose particular position in'trade 
is largely due to pre-war colonial policies which barred 
them from entering many other occupations, are likely to 
face a difficult time, :to the extent that they might 
oppose any socialist-oriented policy which would challenge 
their position. But even if no 'such major transformation 
takes place, their'position remains precarious: the 
indigenous elites may be inclined to,blame them for the 
disastrous effects of the capitalist' growth', strategy 
which they have pursued in close cooperation with, and 
in reliance on" the Chinese and which secured them many 
benefits. 
Full access -to the Southeast Asian market becomes 
all the more urgent for China as it pursues its 'moderni-
zation policy; this will cause inequality in income and 
effective demand at home to increase, while the internal 
market will remain restricted. 
In its attempt to compete on the Southeast Asian 
market, a conflict is unavoidable with Japan which, in 
recent years, ,has shifted more~ and more of its labour-
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intensive indust,ries towards Southeast, ll,sia., But J:apan 
should be willing to come to terms with China on this 
question in exchange for pr-ivileges.in exporting advanced 
technol,ogy to China. 
C):l;ina no longet consi(iersthe United states, to be 
the principal imperialist power and instead seeks, to 
cooperate wi,th it closely in Boutheas,t Asian, ,particu.,. 
larly in Tha;iland. As a consequence, China has abandon-
ed its stlPport for na,t;ionaJ: liberat;ion movements. It 
would seem that, ,such' movements may now advance only 
to the extent tha,t, t):ley attempt to pursue a more indepen-
dent self..,reliant, line. 61 China" however" may continue 
to support the, libel:'ation movement for ta,ctic,al reasons, 
hoping to press, governmeJ;lts anCi comprador' bourgeo'isies 
into cooperation. 
Meanwhile, C):lina whol,eheartedly' welcomes the, rapid 
growth of mili,tary' expenditure ,by AS:E./lli countries. In 
1980, their mi~itary' ex!'enditu,J;es totalled, $5.5 billion; 
a 45 per cent, inClre,a::;,e ove,r, 1979 and almost double that 
of 1975" 'wilen AI!leriqa, was;, c'iefea.ted anCi S,outh Vietm;m" was 
liberated,. In tl1e early 19505, America. used,' the threat 
of, imm;inE!nt C!ilinese ;invas;i_on to support the m;ilit,a,ry 
dictatorship in, Tha,iland, Wl1ich was, declared tl1e, br:idge-" 
head of tl1e, 'f,r,ee, world.' • Now. the Vietnall)es,e thrElat is 
used tp reinfor,ce. protElc,tion of· t,he interes_ts o,f' the 
n~tional r:ul;ing clas.ses and· foreign cap'ita;!.,., OnC:::,e 
a,gain, tl:J.e. tl:lreat of·, ex,te:ma,lcolllmuriist agress·ion is 
thus used to expan(i counter,..,in,s,ur,gency ope;r:a"t,;ions .• 62. 
l:;OME E:INAL CONSIDERATIONS. 
ThE! 'Cloali.tion' be,tw:,een', t;he United S,ta,tes, Japan and: 
China, a,nt:'!" th,e coope;ra,tion of all three wi,t,l1 repress,;iv:e 
governl!lentsant:'! mi;!.itary d;ictatorships, is li_kely to 
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aggravate further~ the~ ~cond;it~ions~ of ~~mass poverty in~ ~ - ~ 
Southeast Asia~ as in ~the rest of the world. The princi-
pal contradiction will continue to be that between the 
ruling classes in, the hegemonic indl,istrialized countries 
of the North and their partners'and,allies in Souther~ 
countries which are incorporated into this dominant 
world order, and the mass of peasants and workers in the' 
latter countri~s with, 'as' minor partners, tile working 
(and unemployed) people in the North. The evolutions in 
the central accumulation of capital during recent years 
turn more clearly than ever, before the majority of 
working people in South and North into victims of Capital. 
The dependency of Russia, Eastern Europe and China on, 
'Northern capital and technology entails that the working 
people ,of the East also become increasingly subordinated 
to the requirements of central capital, accumulation. It 
is not likely that Northern governments would' ever 
,frontally oppose the~ MNCs which have come to repres~nt 
the'very foundations of prosperity. It is difficult to 
predict how the needs. of Northern ruling classes to 
protect the prevailing order (rooted in,the protection 
and promotion of free use and concentra'tion of property 
and capital) and a decline in, acquired rights and con-
ditions of livelihood by the working people, might 
fom~nt popular ,movements to ,press fOr f~ndamental change. 
So far, the demands of the working people in the North 
have helped Capital to integrate them ever more into the 
prevailing capitalist order. Until recently, each round of 
demands 'was rewar,ded by the corporations with a wage increase, but 
this in turn was recompensed by:Capital from,a rise in 
prices, automation, and a shift of productive capital in 
order to disarm labour. It would seem that the point is 
being reached where the claim for a qualitatively diffe-
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rent kind of society will no longer be the concern 
solely of a small 'minority, but the myth that the good' 
life is due to the blessings of capitalism will break 
down for larger groups bringing with it'an urgent need 
for a new lifestyle, preceded and accompanied by a major 
rise in political and social ,conflict; , 
The growingc,ontro1 by:monopo1y capitalism of the 
'socialist' countries of the East is likely to aggravate 
the cOIltx-adictions that exist there. This will stimulate' 
further pressures not only for political, but also for 
economic and political democracy and bas,ic human ,rights.' 
In ... the South this process can only be e'xpedted to advance 
by the growth and expansion of national liberation 
movements ,which ,will operate as anti-imperialist socia-
list movements.' ,In the past, such movements made -major 
strides'only because the ruling classes denied elementary 
freedoms andtlle basic right to livelihood' to'the majority 
population; These, movements ,may 'not always receive the' 
support ,of 'socialist 'S'tates which, from reasons of 
self-interest, !may not ,wish 'the new ,socialist 'moveme'hts 
to succeed. 'The contradictions between old'sociali'st' 
states, ;however, are likely always to create support 'for 
'new ',socialist s'tates. 
Can ,a social·istsociety flourish in a world ,system 
.which is ,still dominated by thecap'ita1ist 'mode 'of 
production and profitability criteria? The absence of 
s'uffiCiently strong countei:vaili~g forces against the 
rules dictated 'by the domi,nant world eC0nomymakes it 
difficult for socialist societies to withstand pressures 
that ,mi1itat~ against :production for use-va1ue. 63 In no 
way is priority given to the needs of the world popula-
tion for food and for other basic dimensions of liveli-
hood. The ,criterion on which a socialist movement is 
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judged shouid be whether .it furthers the gr()wth of an 
economy geared,to use-values, ,not only at home, but also 
in the world at large. In fact, these two points are 
indivisible. 
The ruling classes in the capitalist countries and 
Russia, and the new leadership, in China, appear to share 
the optimistic belief that unlimited developm,ent of 
science and technology will secure',nationai superiority 
and strength and will also solve the, problem of 'develop-
ment' • This shared view lead,S to an, ever-growing rivalry 
for power. The dynamics, of this,process become more and 
more ominous. The production of weapons with which to 
resol ve the, crisis in, accumulation is growing rapidly,' 
a,s is the quest for intensified militariza'tion., In 
1984, 32.5% of the American budget will be reserved for 
defence', i.e. 250 billion dqllars, excluding intelli-, 
~ence and other service expenditures. In other words, 
every American family wi.ll have tq pay $4000 tax as a 
contribution to defence. At the same time, 'expenditures 
on education, health" housing and social security will 
sharply be reduced. 
The cold war climate which ,the Reagan Administration 
is again creating seems to'be a sign of decline in u.s. 
capacity to overcome the disintegration of the capitalist 
system. The threat of internat:ional terrorism and com-
munism is once, again used to secure support for a rapid 
step-up of advanced arms:prodl:!ction and sales and to 
legitimize America's intervention. This serves aS,a' 
cover under to secure continued control over raw materials 
in South America, ' the Middle East, Africa and, Asia. 64 
It may not be long before America, in the context of its 
new global counter-insur~ency strategy, will step up the 
despatch of military advisers to Southeast Asia. The 
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present trend under the Reagan Administration and in 
particular under Secretary Haig is for re-Vietnamization. 65 
The advent of democracy in the industrialized 
states has historically been' closely connected with the 
transfer of surpl'us from the ,incorporated South, making 
it possible for the ruling class to meet the demands of 
the labouri~g class. 66 The new nature of monopoly 
capital,ism is manifest in its capaci,ty to dis'charge its 
self-made crisis not only in the South but also 'at 
home', by pressing for the' restriction of social 'and 
economic rights acquired by the labouring classes in the 
process of industrialization. This ushers in a new 
situation in which ,the peoples of the South and North 
arid East are drawn into the same struggle for survival 
and a new way 'of life. ' 
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year during, which every effort has been made to 
raise peasant incomes and give' farmers more freedQm 
to decide what they grow. Undoubtedly the Party's 
attacks on Mao Zedong's poli'cy of laying the main 
emphasis on grain production has had an effect, 
-encouraging the peasants to grow 'more ,subsidiary 
food crops for industry and export~ as well as for 
their own consumptioI:\ and sale on, the open market.' 
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Opportunity, (Asian Development Bank, Manila, 1977).' 
The findings of the Survey contain a radical critique 
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recemmendatiens,hewever, are largely cenventienal. 
ern view ef its radical analysis,the sur·vey was net 
endersed by the Bank, whose Japanese 'President 
declared that the Bank weuld enly 'review its 
pelicies in ·the lightef the Survey's general 
recemmendatiens'. ~hese recemmendatiens cencern the 
nee'd'forprefeund institutienal changes as a pre-
requisite fer .dev:elepment. Recegni.tien· ef such a 
'needweuld indeed bewhelly incempatible with the 
Bank"s' functien as capitalist grewth and .expert 
premeter. See He Kwon Ping : .. , Asian ,agricultural 
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bordering Hong Kong and Macao and another to be 
shortly established in front of Tai.wan. The depart"'; 
ing premier,. Hua Guo Feng, emp~asized in his speech 
the need to create a flexible 'market and to make 
production respond to market demand. No attention 
was'given to the problem of the growing.under-
utilization of labour and unemployment in the 
. countryside, except for stringent guidelines to 
restrict population growth. Representatives from 
the hinterland will have to face a difficult time. 
The revolutionary elan has gone and has been dis-
credited. The id~als of self-reliance, i.e. rely on 
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dually reducing protective tariffs, liberalizing 
import licensing, reviewing .incentives to encourage 
expqrts. • • The measures foll:ow the granting of a 
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Bank granted the loan of 600 million will plunge 
the country deeper into debt, since the total 
capital requirement will ·be no .less than 6 billion 
dollars •.• ' 
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Barang:'Les militaires et .. lepouvoir dans ,1'Asie 
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these relations frem the peint of view .of political 
stability. In that sense, their intreduction .or 
maintenance may rightly be viewed as .one of the 
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must~realize how serious a threat an agrarian 
revolution could be at this point .of his'tory, even 
H the upheaval seems justified from that, point of 
view. The only way to thwart communist design ,in 
Asia is tq preclude such revolutionary outbursts 
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